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Abstract. By showing the uncertainty surrounding a pre-
diction, probabilistic forecasts can give an earlier indica-
tion of potential upcoming floods, increasing the amount of
time available to prepare. However, making a decision based
on probabilistic information is challenging. As part of the
UK-wide policy’s move towards forecast-based flood risk
management, the Environment Agency (EA), responsible for
managing risks of flooding in England, is transitioning to-
wards the use of probabilistic fluvial forecasts for flood early
warning. While science and decision-making are both indi-
vidually progressing, there is still a lack of an ideal frame-
work for the incorporation of new and probabilistic science
into decision-making practices, and, respectively, the uptake
of decision-makers’ perspectives in the design of scientific
practice. To address this, interviews were carried out with EA
decision-makers (i.e. Duty Officers), key players in the EA’s
flood warning decision-making process, to understand how
they perceive this transition might impact on their decision-
making. The interviews highlight the complex landscape in
which EA Duty Officers operate and the breadth of factors
that inform their decisions, in addition to the forecast. Al-
though EA Duty Officers already account for uncertainty and
communicate their confidence in the forecast they currently
use, the interviews revealed a decision-making process which
is still very binary and linear to an extent, which appears at
odds with probabilistic forecasting. Based on the interview
results, we make recommendations to support a successful
transition to probabilistic forecasting for flood early warning
in England. These recommendations include the new sys-
tem’s co-design together with Duty Officers, the prepara-
tion of clear guidelines on how probabilistic forecast should
be used for decision-making in practice, EA communication
with all players in the decision-making chain (internal and
external) that this transition will become operational practice
and the documentation of this transition to help other insti-
tutes yet to face a similar challenge.
We believe that this paper is of wide interest for a range of
sectors at the intersection between geoscience and society. A
glossary of technical terms is highlighted by asterisks in the
text and included in Appendix A.
Published by Copernicus Publications on behalf of the European Geosciences Union.
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1 Introduction
The ongoing shift in UK policy from “flood defence” to-
wards a forecast-based “flood risk∗ management” approach
to better anticipate floods (Dale et al., 2012; McEwen et
al., 2012) has shaped a series of developments in the up-
take of flood forecasting science in practice, often imple-
mented in the wake of significant flood events. Following the
summer 2007 UK floods, the development of the National
Flood Forecasting System (NFFS) and the Flood Forecasting
Centre (FFC∗, a UK Met Office and Environment Agency
(EA)∗ partnership; Department for Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs, 2014) was prioritised, with the aim of improv-
ing national flood warning services (Pitt, 2008; Stephens and
Cloke, 2014). The winter 2013/14 UK floods illustrated the
value of these institutional changes to flood forecasting as
well as the value in using new forecasting techniques, such as
ensemble∗ surge forecasts∗, for flood preparedness∗ (Flow-
erdew et al., 2009; Stephens and Cloke, 2014). It was also
during the 2013/14 floods that the EA moved from using a
single prediction of upcoming floods (known as a determin-
istic forecast∗) to using two fluvial (river) flood scenarios∗,
a “best estimate”∗ and a “reasonable worst case”∗ (see more
information below), for flood incident management in Eng-
land (FFC, 2020). However, the recent winter 2019/2020 UK
floods have shown that this approach could be further im-
proved to better capture the uncertainty∗ in upcoming floods
and communicate risk more effectively.
The recent floods exposed a limitation in our fore-
casting approach by only running flood models
with a Best Estimate and Reasonable Worst Case
meteorological inputs. Whilst this approach is fine
at providing a high level general meteorological
input to flood forecast models small variances
in rainfall profiles within and across catchments
makes a big difference in river response and flood
risk. Modelling the impacts of snow accumula-
tion and melting was also a particular problem
[...] Being able to run meteorological ensembles
through our flood forecasting models to determine
the probability of different magnitudes of flood im-
pacts within and across catchments would in my
view have given us a better understanding of river
response and allowed for clearer communication of
risk from forecasters to responders. [...] There was
a lot we did well but a lot we can do better (Neil
Ryan, lead modelling and forecasting duty officer
at the EA Leeds Forecasting Centre, March 2020)
In 2016, the UK National Flood Resilience Review
(NFRR; HM Government, 2016; House of Commons – En-
vironment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, 2016) indeed
recommended a better integration of probabilistic forecasts∗
of the weather into flood forecast products to improve the
characterisation of uncertainty in future water levels and to
enhance the communication of flood risk and likelihood, to
inform a range of flood management measures∗ (as the quote
above alludes to). Probabilistic flood forecasts express the
likelihood of possible future high river flow scenarios and
can be produced by forcing∗ a hydrological model∗ with an
ensemble of future meteorological scenarios (Cloke and Pap-
penberger, 2009). By indicating how likely a flood is to occur,
probabilistic forecasts communicate an estimate of the uncer-
tainty surrounding a prediction (expressed as a probability)
and can support risk-based decision-making through an in-
creased probability of detection of floods (reducing missed
events∗), an earlier indication of potential future extreme
events, such as floods, and their associated impacts (Buizza,
2008; Verkade and Werner, 2011; Dale et al., 2012; Stephens
and Cloke, 2014). Based on research for the Thames River
basin (UK), New et al. (2007) showed that probabilistic fore-
casts provide more informative results (i.e. by allowing one
to quantify the potential impacts of upcoming floods and
their associated likelihood) than a scenario-based approach,
as is currently used operationally at the EA.
The EA, an executive non-departmental public body spon-
sored by Defra∗ (the UK government Department for En-
vironment, Food & Rural Affairs), is responsible for the
operational management of flood risks from rivers and the
sea in England (under the Flood and Water Management
Act, 2010; Werner et al., 2009; Department for Environ-
ment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2014; Pilling et al., 2016).
Their role is to warn and inform the public and businesses
about impending coastal and fluvial floods. The EA also
has a strategic overview role for all sources of flooding and
works with lead local flood authorities (i.e. emergency re-
sponder categories 1, e.g. police services, fire and rescue au-
thorities, and 2, e.g. utilities, telecommunications, transport
providers, Highways Agency) by providing guidance, knowl-
edge and support in responding to flooding. The EA Moni-
toring and Forecasting Duty Officers (MFDOs) and Flood
Warning Duty Officers (FWDOs) are two roles at the heart
of the EA’s internal forecast-led decision-making process and
are responsible for coordinating local flood warning.
It is within the remit of their responsibilities for the EA
to move away from incident response and implement flood
risk management policy. As part of this wider move and since
2016, the EA’s flood incident management strategy∗ has been
based on the principle “think big, act early, be visible” (En-
vironment Agency, 2018). Under the umbrella of this prin-
ciple, the EA’s objectives are to quantify uncertainty, make
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decisions around incident preparation and escalation (to en-
sure that resources are put in place early and that the EA is
prepared to scale up or down closer to the potential incident,
e.g. expanding incident rotas with Duty Officers on standby,
requesting equipment to support preventative and/or repair
work, such as temporary barriers and pumps) and communi-
cate flood risk clearly internally and externally (Tim Norton,
personal communication, 2019). To this end, based on hydro-
meteorological∗ forecasts received from the FFC daily, the
EA currently (and since the UK winter floods of 2013/14 as
mentioned above) produces two deterministic fluvial flood
scenarios with a 5 d lead time∗, a “best estimate” and a “rea-
sonable worst case”. The EA’s operating practice provides
guidance on how to use these scenarios to support decision-
making for a range of flood incident management activities,
in line with the EA’s principle. In summary, the “reasonable
worst case” gives an indication of what “could” happen (i.e.
the upper range of forecast rainfall, river conditions and im-
pacts that may occur) and should be used for preparation
and informing others. The “best estimate” gives an indica-
tion of what “should” happen (i.e. the middle range of fore-
cast rainfall, river conditions and impacts that may occur)
and should be used as the basis for planning where and when
to issue flood warnings (Susan Manson, personal communi-
cation, 2020). Together, the two scenarios provide the scale
and size of the incident for planning and response prepara-
tions (FFC, 2020).
The two EA flood scenarios are an intermediate step be-
tween deterministic and probabilistic fluvial flood forecast-
ing (n.b. probabilistic coastal flood forecasts are already op-
erational and this paper focuses on fluvial flood forecasting),
as outlined as essential by the NFRR. The new probabilistic
flood forecasting system is currently being technically devel-
oped and several feasibility projects have been carried out
to guide the FFC’s move towards probabilistic fluvial flood
forecasts (Pitt, 2008; Orr and Twigger-Ross, 2009; Sene et
al., 2007; 2009, 2010; Dale et al., 2013). However, as the EA
will have to accommodate these probabilistic fluvial flood
forecasts in practice, there is still a lack of clarity about how
they should be used for flood incident management and by
the EA Duty Officers for flood warning decision-making.
Probabilistic forecasts can be challenging to use for op-
erational decision-making∗, given the explicit uncertainty
information they communicate (Nicholls, 1999; Cloke and
Pappenberger, 2009; Demeritt et al., 2010; Nobert et al.,
2010; Ramos et al., 2010; Stephens et al., 2012). Having
to translate a range of possible outcomes into an opera-
tional decision (such as sending out a flood warning) is in-
tricate and requires careful interpretation and an understand-
ing of probabilities, risk, uncertainty and the systems mod-
elled (Dessai and Hulme, 2004). Furthermore, warning based
on low probabilities of a flood, for example, will reduce the
chance of missing an event but might also lead to more false
alarms∗. Decisions can be made following a set of rules,
such as threshold exceedance (Dale et al., 2013). However,
the decision-making process is complex and generally influ-
enced by several additional factors. These include the event
type (e.g. a localised small flood event vs. a large-scale ex-
treme flood event), the costs of taking action vs. not taking
action, the decision-maker’s experience of past events, trust
in the forecast (which can be built up over time), personal
risk aversion, and the cultural context in which decisions are
made (Cloke et al., 2009; Arnal et al., 2016; Neumann et al.,
2018).
The aim of this paper is to capture the forecast-based
decision-making landscape in which EA Duty Officers op-
erate to understand how they perceive the potential impacts
of this transition on their decision-making activities. To this
end, a series of interviews was carried out in the summer
of 2018 with EA MFDOs and FWDOs. We hypothesise that
the EA Duty Officers’ decision-making is still very binary
and that many elements of their decision-making process will
have to change to make space for the transition to probabilis-
tic fluvial flood forecasts.
After describing the interview and analysis methods
(Sect. 2), this paper relates how EA MFDOs and FWDOs
make forecast-based decisions in the current EA practice –
with a focus on fluvial flooding and decision-making for up
to the next 5 d, as these are the forecasts that will change
(Sect. 3). Finally, based on the interview results and further
literature findings, we discuss the Duty Officers’ perceived
opportunities and challenges associated with this transition
and make a series of recommendations to support a success-
ful transition to operational probabilistic fluvial flood fore-
casting at the EA.
2 Methods
2.1 Participants
The EA operates over 14 different areas (i.e. broadly based
on catchment delineations) with seven forecasting centres
(hereafter referred to as “centres”; see Fig. 1). Within these
centres, it has several MFDO and FWDO roles, fulfilled by a
number of different people. These are voluntary roles, added
to the staff’s day-to-day job, for which they follow relevant
training. MFDOs receive, process and communicate forecast
information to FWDOs, who are responsible for interpreting
the information and working out the potential impacts on the
ground. The Duty Officers’ schedules are predetermined by
a rota, and Duty Officers are on call for a period of 1 week
at a time. During times of increased flood risk, when more
forecasting or warning activities are required, additional ros-
tering takes place. Duty Officers receive a range of forecasts
(nowcasting∗ products to monthly outlooks∗) and are aware
of potential situations from a month out. Five days ahead is
when the activity really starts to build and is the focus of
these interviews.
A total of six EA MFDOs and FWDOs from three dif-
ferent EA centres (one pair per centre) were interviewed to
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Figure 1. Map showing the geographical areas of the EA’s operations (green numbered areas), highlighting the three areas which the centres
where interviews were carried out are responsible for (blue boxes) (source: EA).
capture a range of perspectives in relation to the topic at
hand, following best practice (Sivle et al., 2014; participant
information sheet provided as the Supplement). Forecasting
and decision-making varies between EA centres due to dif-
ferent management approaches and different types of geog-
raphy and catchment responses∗. To protect anonymity, the
three centres where interviews were carried out are shown in
terms of the wider area they are responsible for: (1) the York-
shire area (YOR) in the north (area 3), (2) the Thames area
(THM) in the south-east (area 11), and (3) the Solent and
South Downs area (SSD) in the south-east (area 14) (Fig. 1).
MFDOs and FWDOs were interviewed in pairs as they
are used to working together and the information they use
sits between these two roles. The thought was that by talk-
ing to the MFDOs alone we would lose the element of “and
so what?”, while talking to the FWDOs alone the forecast-
ing expertise would be lost. All MFDOs and FWDOs inter-
viewed had several years of experience and so were able to
describe the current practice and express personal expecta-
tions of how it might change with probabilistic forecasting.
Participants were selected by EA study co-developer I1 to
meet the above criteria. For the purpose of anonymity, the in-
terviewees will thereafter be reported using codes. The three
MFDOs interviewed will be referred to as MFDO1, MFDO2
and MFDO3, and the three FWDOs interviewed as FWDO1,
FWDO2 and FWDO3 (interviewed pairs are represented by
the same number). As well as those from the MFDOs and
FWDOs, quotes from two EA study co-developers are re-
ported in this paper, I1 and I2, who helped the interviewer
(Louise Arnal) by providing some context about the EA’s or-
ganisational landscape, forecasting systems and MFDO and
FWDO roles prior to the three interviews.
2.2 Interviews
This paper is based on content gathered through interviews
at the EA. Interviews can be an effective method to capture
an institution’s complex cultural landscape (Schoenberger,
1991; Pagano et al., 2004). They can provide interviewers
with an understanding of the world (in this case the institu-
tion world) from the perspective of the informants, shedding
light on their unique perceptions and information only known
to them (Sivle et al., 2014).
Qualitative semi-structured interviews were carried out.
These types of interviews are often used to understand in-
terviewees’ perspectives and allow the exploration of a re-
search question that does not necessitate quantifying infor-
mation and creating generalisations from the interview tran-
scripts. The strength of such studies (compared to other sur-
vey methods) is that they are more sensitive to historical and
institutional complexity and can capture the influence of lo-
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cal context (Schoenberger, 1991; Pagano et al., 2004). More-
over, they are flexible, allowing the interviewer to remodel
questions throughout an interview and from one interview to
the next, to follow up on new information discovered (Sivle
et al., 2014).
A set of open-ended questions was prepared in advance to
guide the discussion and allow for comparability across all
three interviews. To prompt discussion, all three MFDO and
FWDO pairs were asked the same opening question: “Could
you please walk me through what you would do ahead of
a potential flood event?” The following questions were also
prepared in advance, but their order was changed, or they
were skipped depending on whether the interviewees had al-
ready answered them.
– “Could you tell me about the uncertainties in the infor-
mation you said you used in this context?”
– “How do you deal with these uncertainties?”
– “Could you tell me about how you communicate these
uncertainties to each other?”
– “How would your job be influenced by a transition to
probabilistic forecasts?”
Each interview lasted between 30 min and 1 h 30 min. All
interviews were conducted and digitally recorded by the first
author (Louise Arnal) in meeting rooms at the corresponding
EA centres.
2.3 Data analysis
All interviews were transcribed verbatim and transcripts
were analysed qualitatively in order (1) to define the current
practice (i.e. EA Duty Officers’ roles and the information
and systems they use) and (2) to explore, together with the
EA Duty Officers, how they think this transition might affect
their roles and the current practice. These two points provide
the structure for this paper; the results are communicated in
Sects. 3 and 4, respectively.
Although interpretations might have been communicated
by several interviewees, no frequencies are provided as quan-
titative generalisations cannot be inferred from this small and
purposive sample. Following best practice, the results con-
tain a mix of interviewees’ perspectives, supported by quotes
(numbered for cross-reference), and further interpretation of
the interview transcripts by the authors, identifiable through-
out the text (Rowley, 2012; Davies et al., 2014).
3 The current EA forecast-led decision-making
practice
3.1 The EA’s institutional landscape
The schematic in Fig. 2 displays the EA’s institutional land-
scape, with a particular focus on the flood incident man-
agement information flow to and from MFDOs and FW-
DOs. To help manage flood risk, the EA receives hydro-
meteorological forecasts produced by the Flood Forecasting
Centre (FFC) daily (more or less frequently depending on the
forecasting product∗ – see Sect. 3.2.1). The FFC is a partner-
ship between the EA and the UK Met Office which combines
the hydrological and meteorological expertise from both in-
stitutes to produce hydro-meteorological forecasting prod-
ucts for all natural forms of flooding (including river, surface
water, coastal and groundwater flooding; note that in this pa-
per the focus is on river flooding).
Within the EA, the FFC products are combined with the
flood forecasting expertise of the Flood Forecasting team
to then follow two separate routes. The flood forecast in-
formation is relayed higher up the chain to the Strategic
Support and the National Response teams via the National
Flood Forecasting Duty Manager to support national re-
sponse. To support local response, the flood forecast informa-
tion is downscaled to local flood outlooks by the MFDOs and
passed on to the Area Response team, coordinated by Area
Duty Managers and Area Base Controllers who are responsi-
ble for an area’s incident preparation and response. As part of
this team, the FWDOs and the Flood Incident Duty Officers
then combine national information and area impact assess-
ments to coordinate flood warning and operational decision-
making on the ground, respectively. Pre-defined lead times
are assigned to each specific planning and response activity;
e.g. flood warnings are sent with a 2 h minimum lead time, al-
though different lead times have recently been introduced to
account for flood event type and catchment characteristics∗
(i.e. flash flooding vs. a slow responding catchment). FW-
DOs are also part of the Flood Advisory Service, an inte-
grated service provided by the EA and the UK Met Office,
via which the flood forecast is communicated with partners
(e.g. emergency responders) to help them make informed de-
cisions about their flood response. This service is delivered
through emails, teleconferences and face-to-face meetings.
MFDOs and FWDOs are decision-makers∗ at the heart of
the flood forecasting to local flood decision-making process,
which relies vastly on the interaction between their two roles.
Hereafter, we use the term “decision-makers” to refer to the
MFDOs and FWDOs, unless stated otherwise.
3.2 From national hydro-meteorological forecasting to
local flood warning decision-making
The sections below (Sect. 3.2.1 to 3.2.4) describe the flow
of information between MFDOs and FWDOs in an incident
response context (following the numbers in Fig. 2), ahead of
a flood event (i.e. with 2 h to 5 d of lead time, as this is the
timescale likely to be affected by this transition). The content
for these sections is based on the interviewees’ responses to
the question “Could you please walk me through what you
would do ahead of a potential flood event?” It is worth noting
that all interviewed pairs suggested the MFDO answer that
https://doi.org/10.5194/gc-3-203-2020 Geosci. Commun., 3, 203–232, 2020
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Figure 2. Schematic of the EA’s institutional landscape and the flood incident management information flow between MFDOs, FWDOs and
first-degree contact points (red arrows) (source: EA). The numbers highlight the structure of Sect. 3.2.
question before the FWDO, indicating that the forecasting
and decision-making process starts with the MFDO.
My role’s an MFDO so generally if there’s a flood
event coming I should know before the FWDO, in
theory. [MFDO2] (Q1)
3.2.1 The FFC national hydro-meteorological forecasts
The FFC generates three types of products of relevance for
river flooding (i.e. coastal and high tides reports are also pro-
duced but not discussed in this paper; Department for Envi-
ronment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2014). These are produced
with the help of and communicated with the EA.
– Flood outlook products: annual, seasonal and monthly
assessments of flood risk produced up to every 2 weeks
(please note that these are not the focus of this paper;
see paragraph below).
– Flood Guidance Statement (FGS)∗: a 5 d forecast of
flood risk for all sources of flooding, for England and
Wales, at a county scale (i.e. area sub-divisions) and is-
sued daily (with additional issues when significant or
severe impacts are forecast; see Fig. B1a for a past ex-
ample).
– Hydro-Meteorological Services∗: detailed products
communicating flood forecast data, comprising, among
others, a Hydro-meteorological Guidance (i.e. a sum-
mary of the hydro-meteorological situation for the next
5 d and issued once daily; Fig. B1b), Forecast Meteo-
rological Data (i.e. a rainfall summary for the next 5 d
based on the “best estimate” and issued twice daily;
Fig. B1c), a Rainfall Scenario Map (i.e. “reasonable
worst case” scenarios of rainfall amounts for areas
across England and Wales; Fig. B1d), and a Heavy
Rainfall Alert for the next hours to 5 d (i.e. produced
manually for specific rainfall events and communicat-
ing the rainfall amounts and confidence; Fig. B1e and
f).
Since 2007 (this vaguely corresponds to the summer 2007
UK floods), the lead time for which forecasts are shown and
on which MFDOs and FWDOs can take action has increased
from a few days to a few months ahead (i.e. based on the
FFC outlook products). However, the outlook products are
currently mainly used as supporting information, and the EA
relies on the shorter-range forecasts (i.e. FFC 5 d products)
for their flood warning decision-making activities. This is
consistent with findings from Neumann et al. (2018).
So even from a month out now we’re starting to
become aware of potential situations [...], but [...]
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because [...] most of our products [...] are [...] based
on that five-day forecast [...] that’s when the activ-
ity really starts to build. [MFDO1] (Q2)
3.2.2 Local flood forecasting by the MFDOs
The MFDOs’ role is to process the FFC forecasts (see
Sect. 3.2.1) before communicating the local flood forecast
to the FWDOs.
Ramping up to a flood event, the MFDO gath-
ers that information, processes it and filters it,
and passes that along to the area staff [FWDO].
[MFDO2] (Q3)
Based on the suite of FFC national- and county-scale flood
risk information, the MFDOs decide whether they should run
the locally tailored hydrological forecasting model, which
sits in a separate system called the National Flood Forecast-
ing System (NFFS; Fig. B1g), to produce catchment-/local-
scale flood forecasts. This decision can for example be trig-
gered by the colours shown in the FGS, which communicates
flood risk as a combination of likelihood and impact (i.e. high
flood risk values in the FGS are likely to prompt the MFDOs
to run the hydrological model). The NFFS allows users to
explore observed data (i.e. river levels and rainfall) and run
hydrological and hydraulic models∗. These models, forced
with the FFC’s deterministic weather forecast, provide a sin-
gle trace of future (i.e. for the next 5 d) river level at specific
locations. This initial forecast scenario is usually referred to
as the “best estimate” scenario. According to the FGS user
guide, the “best estimate” scenario shows what “should” hap-
pen: it is “a forecaster’s assessment of the middle range of
rainfall, river or groundwater levels or coastal conditions and
impacts that may occur” (FFC, 2020).
What “could” happen (i.e. referred to as the “reasonable
worst case” scenario) may not always be run by the MFDOs.
This decision is usually based on the hydro-meteorological
conditions and on the MFDOs’ expert judgment.
If there’s uncertainty in the forecast like if there’s
showers [...] especially when they’re thundery and
they can give you really high totals in a very short
space of time that’s when you start to run ‘What If’
scenarios. [MFDO1] (Q4)
“What if” scenarios refer to the additional local river level
forecast run by the MFDOs. This is usually done by manu-
ally modifying the FFC’s deterministic weather forecast, us-
ing pre-defined factors applied over an entire catchment (e.g.
a 200 % increase in catchment rainfall totals over the next
6 h). The MFDOs choose which “what if” scenario to run
based on the FFC Hydro-meteorological Guidance, the Rain-
fall Scenario Map and their own expert judgment.
[The FFC] might give us a number of different sce-
narios and we tend to pick the worst one and then
see what that does. [MFDO1] (Q5)
Running this “modified weather forecast” through the hy-
drological/hydraulic models, the MFDOs obtain a supple-
mentary river level forecast scenario to the “best estimate”,
called the “reasonable worst case” scenario (Fig. B1g). Ac-
cording to the FGS user guide, the “reasonable worst case”
scenario shows what “could” happen: it is “a forecaster’s as-
sessment of the upper range of rainfall, river or groundwa-
ter levels or coastal conditions and impacts that may occur”
(FFC, 2020). The MFDOs estimate the likelihood of both
scenarios (i.e. the “best estimate” and the “reasonable worst
case”) based on the “what if” scenario they have run and fur-
ther expert judgment.
A critical part of the MFDOs’ role is to filter the fore-
cast information to make a coherent story (e.g. there may
sometimes be differences between the national- and local-
scale pictures) and put the information into context for the
FWDOs. They do this using additional tools and information
available to them and by applying expert judgement based
on their knowledge of model performance∗ and catchment
response.
Whilst we are very data reliant on the information
coming through, there’s also that experience that
you know that certain watercourses are very slow
responding and [...] no matter how much money we
spend on your forecast, it’s always not very good,
you always delay it by a day and drop the peak
by a bit. [...] Data is very important but that local
experience is as important if not more so in certain
circumstances. [MFDO2] (Q6)
Additional tools and information available to the MFDOs
for example include river level correlations∗ (i.e. they are
calculated using set tables, based on a linear regression be-
tween peak levels upstream and downstream of a station).
These complement the river level forecast and aid MFDOs
in the decision-making process. However, discrepancies be-
tween the forecasts and correlations are possible and can call
into question the forecast accuracy∗.
If the model says you’re going to get flooding,
the correlation says we’re going to get flooding,
we’ve had more rainfall than any previous event,
you know that that decision’s [...] a clear one. If
the model says flooding, the correlation says no
you’re fine, and we’ve had somewhere in the mid-
dle in terms of rainfall, that’s when it gets difficult,
because those borderline calls are really tricky to
make. [I2] (Q7)
The MFDOs’ knowledge of the hydraulic/hydrological
model performances for various types of events and catch-
ments is also key in interpreting the river level forecast.
This can be based on experience, performance measures∗,
the FFC meteorological products’ attached confidence, tar-
get lead times (i.e. the theoretical maximum lead time there
is to send out a flood warning for a catchment before it floods,
https://doi.org/10.5194/gc-3-203-2020 Geosci. Commun., 3, 203–232, 2020
210 L. Arnal et al.: Front line perspectives on transitioning to probabilistic fluvial flood forecasts
pre-calculated for each catchment based on its size, the gauge
location and flood risk in that catchment) and local feedback
from real-time river gauges∗.
3.2.3 Interaction between MFDOs and FWDOs
Weighing the various sources of information available to
them, the MFDOs generally flag a situation to the FWDOs
once they are confident∗ about the signal shown by the river
level forecast. The exact content of the communication de-
pends on each MFDO-FWDO pair but usually contains in-
formation about the scale of the event and their confidence in
the forecast (see Fig. B1h for an example).
Which scenario is going through which threshold
[and] how likely that is to happen” [MFDO1]. “Ap-
proximate [...] scale of the event [...] are we talking
just a bit of water out of bank? Or is it Armaged-
don? [MFDO2] (Q8)
I look at the river level forecasts and then what I
want to know from the MFDO is, does this account
for the rain we’ve had? So, do you think this is
likely to change? Is the forecast I’m seeing on my
screen a good river level forecast? Or do we think
it’s not picked something up properly? [FWDO2]
(Q9)
The conversation can sometimes be bilateral, and the MF-
DOs might also ask the FWDOs questions about local con-
ditions.
Can [the FWDO] provide information [...] in terms
of local sensitivity [...] and are works going on
in that catchment? Is there a gauge out of play?
[MFDO2] (Q10)
The communication between MFDOs and FWDOs varies
across people and EA centres. Factors that might influence
communication – in terms of its trigger, frequency and con-
tent – include the type of event, Duty Officers’ geographi-
cal proximities (i.e. communication in person or by email or
phone), a centre’s practice, and the Duty Officers’ personal-
ity, day-to-day job and level of experience. Some FWDOs
are more proactive than others in obtaining the information
needed to make a decision: while some might wait to be
contacted by the MFDOs with a processed forecast, others
monitor the situation daily. In some cases, the FWDO might
contact the MFDO first to get more details about an area of
concern to them.
The FWDO shouldn’t even really be thinking
about anything until they’ve had a phone call from
the MFDO [...]. Some FWDOs do go a bit more
proactive than that, I think particularly the ones
with the forecasting backgrounds almost can’t help
themselves looking into it. And it depends on per-
sonality as well, some people hate the idea of being
surprised by anything. But it does also depend on
the MFDO. [FWDO2] (Q11)
[...] and [...] then it’s [...] liaising with regional
forecasting [the MFDOs] so they can give us any
more detail or certainty or if we’re concerned about
an area they can watch it a bit more for us [the FW-
DOs]. [FWDO3] (Q12)
The Duty Officers’ level of experience can influence the
content and interpretation of their conversation. Duty Offi-
cers who have been working together for a longer time will
have more ease to interpret and gauge the confidence from
each other’s language, while working with new Duty Offi-
cers can sometimes lead to misinterpretations.
Knowing each other is really important because if
I know it’s [MFDO2] on duty [they’ve] probably
put that interpretation on already. If I get someone
who’s reading off the screen, I put the interpreta-
tion on and if we misjudge that and we both put it
on we could end up getting it too low. [FWDO2]
(Q13)
As can be seen with quote Q8 (i.e. the title of this paper),
the forecast communication process is currently binary to an
extent. However, as hinted by quote Q9, confidence and un-
certainty in the information appear to be communicated be-
tween the MFDOs and FWDOs, usually using the two flood
forecast scenarios. Understanding how the uncertainty will
impact the FWDOs’ decision-making is key.
I don’t think we can withhold uncertainty. One, the
key role for MFDO is providing the forecast. So
it’s getting the forecast as accurate as you can and
then communicating it in the clearest way possible.
So that’s often about interpreting the uncertainty
and communicating it. So we often use the “Rea-
sonable Worst Case” and the “Best Estimate” to do
that. [MFDO1] (Q14)
Uncertainty is present in everything that we do and
every bit of communication, [...] I don’t think I’ve
ever been able to say something with 100 % confi-
dence, ever. [MFDO2] (Q15)
Uncertainty from the forecasting point of view is
always prevalent but understanding how it will im-
pact the [...] area’s reaction is kind of the key thing.
[MFDO2] (Q16)
3.2.4 Local flood warning decision-making by the
FWDOs
The FWDOs’ role is to combine the MFDOs’ processed local
flood forecast with local information to decide whether to
issue a flood alert or warning.
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The role of the FWDO is to make sense of all that
forecasting information and try and work out po-
tentially what the impacts could be of that on the
ground and then make decisions as to whether or
not [they] issue flood alerts, flood warnings or se-
vere flood warnings. [FWDO1] (Q17)
The information available to FWDOs includes the follow-
ing.
– The local flood forecast and its interpretation: produced
by the MFDOs (see Sect. 3.2.2 and 3.2.3).
– Factors within the catchment that could influence river
levels: e.g. blockage from a fallen down tree. This is ad
hoc information and comes from a variety of sources,
including information gathered by community contacts
(e.g. flood wardens∗ and flood action groups∗), by EA
staff and Duty Officers, hydrometric data/CCTV im-
ages, or details of consented works (i.e. work going on
in a channel).
– The situation on nowcasting meteorological products:
e.g. rainfall radar.
– Information about the catchment(s) that might be af-
fected: contained in the Flood Intelligence Files, avail-
able for every gauge of the NFFS. They compile catch-
ment information, such as the highest events on record,
what rainfall led to them, what the catchment state was
at the time and any known impacts.
– Information about communities that might be affected:
e.g. have they been affected by many floods in the past?
The FWDOs combine and assess these various sources of in-
formation (i.e. in terms of their accuracy and uncertainty; ac-
cording to FWDO2, a critical part of the FWDOs’ role is the
“interpretation of the uncertainties” into their impacts on the
ground), together with their expert knowledge about catch-
ment response, to make a judgment call on whether to issue a
flood alert/warning. In some areas however the MFDOs will
tell the FWDOs when they need to issue a warning.
According to EA internal guidelines on using the two flood
scenarios in practice, the “best estimate” should be used as a
basis to issue flood alerts and warnings and the “reasonable
worst case” should be used for incident planning activities
(e.g. resources needed for response). However, both scenar-
ios are currently used for incident planning and communica-
tion with responders and communities, while flood alerts and
warnings are mostly issued based on nowcasting products.
This discrepancy could be due to the challenges associated
with forecast accuracy and lead time, specifically for rapid-
response catchments∗. EA guidelines however encourage the
use of the two scenarios for planning and flood warning ac-
tivities whenever possible, in combination with expert judge-
ment.
The scenarios are planning scenarios and at some
point [...] we move into operational now type fore-
casting. So normally we’d issue a flood warning
with anywhere between 30 min to [...] six hours
lead time, whereas these scenarios are generally
two to 5 d ahead. So you wouldn’t normally [...]
come up with a simple statement that will issue
flood warnings based on the best estimate [...] and
at some point we transition into something that’s
more now that we use for operational decision
making. [I1] (Q18)
Warning procedures can vary across Duty Officers and EA
centres. FWDOs’ risk appetite (i.e. issuing too many or not
enough warnings – risk-averse vs. risk-hungry, which may be
triggered by past events) can influence the decisions taken.
Since the Boxing Day floods I think the next level
of flooding after that there was some discrepancies
amongst the area responses [...] they were a bit [...]
jumpy [...] to not be caught out again which is un-
derstandable. [MFDO2] (Q19)
Some areas and EA centres might be more forecast-led,
while others are more reliant on a nowcasting-type approach.
Discrepancies amongst responses are partially due to histor-
ical differences across areas and EA centres, which could in
turn be a consequence of differences in catchment charac-
teristics (e.g. catchment size, rainfall–runoff response time,
land use) and differences in typical response times (i.e. time
for emergency responders to respond to a flood warning in a
given area; also partly dependent on catchment characteris-
tics).
There are definite differences between areas and
[...] between individual staff, so [town X] are far
more likely to issue flood alerts [...] purely on rain-
fall than [town Y ] is, [town Y ] will generally wait
for a river level to rise and that develops I suppose
out of slight historical differences and personalities
involved. [FWDO2] (Q20)
Some other areas will issue messages based on
forecast whereas, we were always told to base it
on what’s happening, so we kind of wait to see if
the rain comes in and then if anything happens is-
sue. And we get marked on messages that we send
out, so one of the things is the timeliness and if
you’ve issued one, did it actually flood afterwards?
So if you’re obviously issuing on a forecast, then
you’re probably going to get scored low because it
doesn’t always happen, so it’s difficult. [FWDO3]
(Q21)
Please note that Duty Officers do not formally get scored
based on decisions taken; quote Q21 is a figure of speech.
The flood warnings issued are nevertheless captured in the
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Flood Warning Validation Data Base, where a score is given
to each warning based on whether flooding occurred, was
missed, the warning was sent out too late, etc. This database
however does not capture catchment conditions or forecasts
produced at the time the warning was issued (Susan Manson,
personal communication, 2020).
There are additionally exceptions to the warning proce-
dures for certain types of events and depending on the time
of day a flood is expected to occur. For given types of events,
such as convective rainfall events∗, for which the Duty Offi-
cers know models are still limited, they might decide to issue
a warning based on the “reasonable worst case”, although it
is “technically against procedure” (MFDO2). FWDO3 also
mentions the possibility of issuing flood alerts based on the
forecast (see quote Q21) when the impact is expected to oc-
cur overnight or if the forecast displays “rarely high confi-
dence” of rainfall and “if it’s a more prolonged event” and
“the catchment’s already wet”.
Other factors that may cause the FWDOs to deviate from
standard warning procedures may be political. There is for
example usually a political element to the response immedi-
ately following a very major flood event, as the EA puts a
greater focus on demonstrating to communities and the gov-
ernment that they are being proactive in warning, informing,
etc. There is also the need for the EA to align its message
with actions of lead local flood authorities and responders
and to think about public response.
There are lots of external pressures as well, par-
ticularly as FWDO you can come under pressure
from all different types of sources to make deci-
sions and perhaps not based on the evidence that
you’ve got for political reasons, [...] reputational
reasons, organisation, in terms of being seen to be
active, seen to [...] act early. [FWDO1] (Q22)
It’s managing expectations internally in terms of
operational response and how this is going to po-
tentially play out which [...] can still be quite
hard to do but it’s even harder to do it externally
with [the] mood of the public or even some of
our professional partners, so local authorities are
also obviously geared up to respond to flooding.
[FWDO1] (Q23)
The EA’s principle, “think big, act early, be visible”, might
also influence the Duty Officers’ decision-making (Environ-
ment Agency, 2018). In what ways do the EA’s statutory
warning responsibilities and principle influence decision-
making? Does “act early” put the forecast in first place, while
“think big” and “be visible” move it to a secondary position?
Our mantra to incident response is think big, act
early so sometimes [...] there is a danger that you’re
over responding. Somewhere you’re issuing alerts
and warnings when actually the risk is low. So I
think the role of the FWDO is to assimilate all that
information, forecasting information and using it
to help inform the instant response but also manage
expectations. [FWDO1] (Q24)
Messages to the public are worded with care to communi-
cate the appropriate level of risk and prompt appropriate re-
sponse, and also contain some information about confidence
and uncertainty (see Fig. B1i and j for past examples of an
EA flood warnings and alerts map and an EA fluvial flood
alert message, both produced for and available to the pub-
lic). As stated by internal EA guidelines, the language used
should change according to each scenario. This can be seen
as a step towards communicating probabilities.
If messages around a “Reasonable Worst Case”
use, could or [...] is possible; if it’s a “Best Esti-
mate” use, we expect, it’s probable. [I1] (Q25)
To help [Duty Officers] get used to the language
and the way they’re working around scenarios and
probabilistic forecasting. [I1] (Q26)
Public messages are usually free-text messages and will
therefore vary across FWDOs.
The message starts off with this flood warning has
been issued for this place then it runs on after a
while into detail which is where you can commu-
nicate those shades of grey. [FWDO2] (Q27)
To conclude this section on the current EA practice, it is
evident that, while forecasting supports incident response by
providing a critical piece of information, Duty Officers have
to make trade-offs, taking different sources of information
into consideration for their decision-making process.
Forecasting’s really important. It is, it should be
really central to what we do [...] but actually it’s a
small cog in the middle of a much bigger wheel.
[I1] (Q28)
We always implore people to try and look at differ-
ent sources of information. [I2] (Q29)
Additional sources of information and factors include
river level correlations, model performance, local knowl-
edge, personal experience, internal procedures and politics
(see Fig. 3). However, the forecast helps determine the tim-
ing of warning and response activities. Because the forecast
is a piece within a much bigger system, will the transition
to probabilistic forecasting have very minor impacts on the
Duty Officers? Or, on the contrary, could it unsettle this very
complex machine?
4 Duty Officers’ perceptions on what the future
practice might look like
The transition to probabilistic forecasts is a significant evo-
lution, which will undeniably bring some changes at the EA,
and generates mixed feelings amongst the Duty Officers.
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Figure 3. Complex flood forecast interpretation landscape in which EA Duty Officers operate.
Whether it creates as many problems as it solves,
maybe. [I2] (Q30)
Probabilistic forecasting is kind of a fresh start for
everyone. [FWDO2] (Q31)
This section presents the interviewed Duty Officers’ per-
spectives (as quotes) on what the future practice might look
like for EA Duty Officers. In light of these findings and
relevant literature findings, we make a list of recommenda-
tions to support the uptake of probabilistic forecasts at the
EA. These recommendations concern actions we think the
EA should take with high priority. The service, role owners
and those responsible for ensuring a quality service deliv-
ery should ensure that these recommendations are pursued,
alongside technical work around the transition. Please note
that these recommendations are not ranked in priority order
for the EA, as some of these will be quicker and easier to
implement and to demonstrate progress on.
4.1 The FFC national hydro-meteorological forecasts
At the time of the interviews, very little was known to
Duty Officers about the new probabilistic forecasting sys-
tem (which research and implementation project started in
November 2008; Sene et al., 2009, 2010). However, at least
one interviewed MFDO was involved in the future system’s
technical implementation.
While the new system’s design was not formerly known by
all yet, some interviewees think that the probabilistic forecast
could help materialise the uncertainty otherwise sometimes
hidden with the two scenarios.
I think in a good way [...] it will [...] reveal the un-
certainty that’s hidden by apparent simplicity. [I1]
(Q32)
Many interviewees however seem concerned that the prob-
abilistic forecast could add another layer of uncertainty
to their already uncertain decision-making process (see
Sect. 3.2).
Uncertainties are very tricky to deal with, whether
probabilistic forecasting and a switch to that is go-
ing to help? [MFDO2] (Q33)
That would be my concern that it’s even more
information and more uncertainty and it’s kind
of like, well what do you do with this informa-
tion? And which bit do you communicate to who?
[FWDO3] (Q34)
From these interviews, it is apparent that in the current
practice (see Sect. 3.2) Duty Officers see uncertainty as an
inherent component of their decision-making process (see
quotes Q14–16) and appreciate that forecasts convey uncer-
tain information, not unlike other types of information they
use, which they currently communicate using the two flood
scenarios. Decision-makers “view uncertainty as an unavoid-
able factor [...] all information about the future is uncertain
[and] they must make decisions under uncertainty every day”
(Morss et al., 2005). This is in line with the positive percep-
tion captured in quote Q32 about probabilistic forecasts re-
vealing otherwise hidden uncertainty. In fact, numerous stud-
ies have shown that decision-makers want to see that uncer-
tainty, which they do not necessarily perceive as a barrier to
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use (Morss et al., 2005; McCarty et al., 2007; Bruen et al.,
2010; Neumann et al., 2018). Ramos et al. (2013) have addi-
tionally shown that providing uncertainty attached to a fore-
cast leads to more optimal and consistent decisions across
decision-makers; when decision-makers “are not provided
with estimates of forecast uncertainty they attempt to take un-
certainty into account on their own” (as hinted by quote Q13
about the current practice), which may lead to important er-
rors and/or risk-averse decisions (Joslyn and Savelli, 2010;
Joslyn et al., 2011; Ramos et al., 2013; Michaels, 2014).
However, while they appreciate that the information con-
veyed by forecasts is uncertain, many Duty Officers ex-
pressed worries about the consequences this “visible uncer-
tainty” may have for their decision-making process as they
perceive this transition as an increase in information (see
quotes Q33 and Q34). Mu et al. (2018) looked at decisions
taken by participants based on the UK Met Office weather
risk matrix, with varying information content and format, and
concluded that “while increasing the information with con-
tent of warnings is usually beneficial and increases the trust
in the warning system, it must be done with caution since bet-
ter decisions (judged by higher profits) are not always made
with an increase of information.” This was also put forward
by Michaels (2014).
These trade-offs highlight the need for a careful design of
the probabilistic forecasting system. Indeed, a great amount
of research has explored the impacts of graphical representa-
tion of uncertainty in hazard forecasts on decision-making,
and it showed that the design and communication of un-
certainty information can impact the nature of actions taken
and should be tackled with care (Bruen et al., 2010; Joslyn
and Savelli, 2010; Stephens et al., 2012; Pappenberger et al.,
2013; Sivle et al., 2014; Mulder et al., 2017). In this con-
text, opening a dialogue between forecasters, developers and
end-users and allowing for all parties to be involved in the
co-design of forecast products is vital (Morss et al., 2005;
Smith et al., 2018; Fundel et al., 2019).
Recommendation 1. While Duty Officers acknowledge
the value of probabilistic forecasts for communicating
otherwise hidden uncertainty, they are worried about the
impact it may have on their decision-making process.
We therefore recommend the expansion of existing EA
communication structures to allow the co-design of the
new probabilistic forecast products between FFC fore-
casters and Duty Officers. This will ensure that Duty
Officers have a say in the new system’s uncertainty vi-
sualisation and communication in FFC documents and
may help tackle some of their worries.
The idea expressed in quote Q34, that probabilistic fore-
cast means “even more information and more uncertainty”,
highlights a common misconception about probabilistic fore-
casting. Indeed, probabilistic forecasts do not add more un-
certainty, but they offer a formal estimate of the uncer-
tainty inherent in the information conveyed (e.g. river lev-
els). This highlights forecast users’ need for accurate infor-
mation (as seen in the current practice; Sect. 3.2), which
may seem to be at odds with probabilistic forecasting (Mc-
Carthy et al., 2007). It further hints that there is still an im-
portant barrier between scientists/scientific notions and fore-
cast users, which the geoscience community should aim to
tackle. As pointed out by Morss et al. (2005), “the way sci-
entists referred to and discussed uncertainty sometimes con-
fused practitioners”.
Recommendation 2. The misconception that proba-
bilistic forecasts add “more uncertainty” calls for the
adequate training of EA Duty Officers on probabilis-
tic forecasting. This training could be delivered by fore-
casters from the FFC or by institutes the EA is already
working with (e.g. JBA Consulting, the University of
Reading, the University of Leeds). In this context, us-
ing serious games may help deliver the right messages
in an engaging setting (see the HEPEX (http://hepex.
irstea.fr/resources/hepex-games, last access: 10 August
2020) and the Red Cross Climate Centre (http://www.
climatecentre.org/resources-games/games, last access:
10 August 2020) resources and the IMPREX on-
line game (https://www.imprex.arctik.tech/, last access:
10 August 2020) for inspiration).
4.2 Local flood forecasting by the MFDOs
From these interviews, it is apparent that this transition is not
perceived as particularly challenging by and for the MFDOs,
despite the changes it might incur.
I think the MFDO role won’t change, it will still be
to communicate a forecast but the [...] wording of
the forecast may change slightly. [MFDO1] (Q35)
I think from our point of view it will just mean a bit
more interpretation of forecasts and then [...] just a
slightly different way of passing it on [...]. But I
don’t think it will change the process. [MFDO3]
(Q36)
The interviewed MFDOs mentioned several potential op-
portunities they perceive this transition will bring. Some in-
terviewees for example mentioned that the two scenarios, and
the “what if” scenarios used to produce them, were some-
times complicated to play with and required a lot of expert
judgment, making them inconsistent nation-wide. A few MF-
DOs thought probabilistic forecasts might lead to more con-
sistency across the EA centres.
The new flood forecasting system is being devel-
oped at the moment so it’s going to replace the
NFFS. [The] benefits to that I suppose [...] are that
if we can look to be more consistent across the
country in even simple things like what displays
look like [...] we’re more interoperable if we need
to. [MFDO1] (Q37)
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According to an interviewee, probabilistic forecasts could
help with new staff training by increasing their understanding
of catchment response.
I can see some benefits to it, especially when
you’ve got less experienced staff [...], you’re al-
most [...] showing them the breadth of what a
catchment could do given a range of responses.
[MFDO2] (Q38)
As shown by quote Q37, this transition is perceived as an
opportunity for more consistency across EA centres. How-
ever, given the heterogeneity of the EA at a national level
and the areas’ diversity in terms of history and catchment re-
sponse (as highlighted in the current practice Sect. 3), we do
not expect probabilistic forecasts to be welcomed similarly
in all the EA centres. This is transparent in the variety of per-
ceptions captured by quotes in this Sect. 4.
Recommendation 3. Considering the existing differ-
ences in the current practice across EA centres, we rec-
ommend that the EA ensure a simultaneous transition in
all its centres.
As mentioned by Handmer and Proudley (2007), decision-
making based on probabilistic forecasts can be challeng-
ing because of situation-specific factors, which vary greatly
across events, EA centres and catchments as shown in the
current practice Sect. 3 and as suggested by quote Q38. In
this context, Nobert et al. (2010) advocate training for en-
semble prediction system users to be locally tailored to the
local experience of different audiences.
Recommendation 4. To account for the heterogeneity
of local conditions, existing dynamics and institutional
practices across EA centres, we recommend that the EA
carry out a locally tailored customised transition within
each centre. Building on recommendation 1, we recom-
mend the co-design of the probabilistic forecasting sys-
tem with a panel of Duty Officers representative of all
EA areas. Moreover, training and the Duty Officers’ op-
erating procedures should adequately reflect these local
differences.
4.3 Interaction between MFDOs and FWDOs
It is worth noting that none of the interviewees mentioned
worries concerning potential impacts of this future transi-
tion on the communication and interaction between their two
roles.
Between us [Duty Officers], it’s probably OK be-
cause we’ve got that understanding of the roles.
[FWDO3] (Q39)
This transition is perceived as an opportunity by MFDOs
for more confidence and credibility when communicating
with FWDOs.
If you’ve got a huge spread then you know that
there’s a very wide range of impact potentially, but
if [...] everything’s within a couple of centimetres
of each other, it gives you a lot more confidence in
saying, no I think we’re going, we’re not going to
see a threshold crossing. So [...] it will help deci-
sion making I think. [MFDO3] (Q40)
In a study exploring the use of ensemble hydrological
forecasts by decision-makers throughout Europe, Ramos et
al. (2013) found that most decision-makers used the uncer-
tainty information from the ensemble forecast to confirm the
deterministic forecast. They observed that if the ensemble
forecast showed a similar signal to the deterministic forecast,
it made them more confident (as highlighted by quote Q40).
If the two forecasts’ signals differed, it made them more
“confused”. This happens to some extent in the current EA
practice, where discrepancies between the two flood scenar-
ios and the river level correlations can call into question the
forecast accuracy (see quote Q7). We can imagine that this
could still happen in the future practice if the probabilistic
forecast shows a wide range of possible outcomes or a differ-
ent signal to for example the “best estimate” (if still in use).
However, the various information sources and tools that
constitute the Duty Officers’ current practice are vital in their
decision-making process, as shown in Sect. 3. Indeed, as
shown by Pidgeon and Fischhoff (2011), decision-makers
may benefit “from different perspectives that help them clar-
ify the implications of a decision on what they value”.
Recommendation 5. To clarify how the probabilistic
forecast should be used in combination with the tools
and information sources Duty Officers are already us-
ing in the current practice, we recommend updating the
Duty Officers’ operating procedures to contain specific
guidelines about the various sources of information of-
ficially available to Duty Officers for decision-making,
how to interpret a probabilistic forecast, the forecast
confidence at which given decisions and actions should
be made and the language that should be used. The up-
dated guidelines should also describe a course of action
to be followed by Duty Officers when the probabilistic
forecast shows a contrasting signal to the deterministic
forecast or other information sources.
Duty Officers seem optimistic as to the impact this transi-
tion may have on their interaction. However, as mentioned
by Michaels (2014), with “deterministic models it was eas-
ier to consider that a linear approach to forecast transmission
was adequate”, as was observed to some extent in the current
practice as MFDOs generally flag a situation to the FWDOs
once they are confident about the signal shown by the river
level forecast (Sect. 3.2.3). We can imagine that the Duty Of-
ficers’ interaction might become less linear with probabilis-
tic forecast and may as a result require more comprehensive
discussions than it sometimes does in the current practice
(Sect. 3.2.3).
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Recommendation 6. To lay foundations for adequate
probabilistic forecast transmission from MFDOs to FW-
DOs, which we expect to be less linear than with deter-
ministic forecasting, we recommend combined MFDO–
FWDO training.
4.4 Local flood warning decision-making by the FWDOs
This transition generated mixed perceptions with regards to
the FWDOs’ role. Some interviewees believe that probabilis-
tic forecasts will not solve the fundamental need for flood
warning decision-making to be “binary” and see this transi-
tion as a potential cause of misunderstandings both internally
and externally.
All the communication research we hear about
generally says [...] the public message has to be as
simple as possible, so that is working the opposite
way to any proposal for probabilistic forecasting.
[FWDO2] (Q41)
A lot of local authorities standing their staff up,
putting them on standby for a weekend is quite a
big budget thing [...]. So [...] if we say, it is go-
ing to flood, they can justify the spend on it [...].
If we pass it on as shades of grey, a lot of them,
they’ll appreciate the information but some of them
would actually resent having the decision forced
on them because they will struggle to then justify
doing something or they’ll be blamed, either way,
blamed for spending money if it doesn’t happen
and blamed for not spending enough if it does hap-
pen. [FWDO2] (Q42)
You’re still going to have this overriding issue
with fast responding catchments where one sce-
nario says we might need to issue a flood warning
but 99 of them say no. Someone has to make a de-
cision. [MFDO1] (Q43)
I think still for a lot of people the question they [...]
want answered is am I going to flood? [I2] (Q44)
Some interviewees also expressed the worry that proba-
bilistic forecasts might push more of the interpretation fur-
ther down the decision-making line and on to the FWDOs.
Having probabilistic forecasting just moves the
burden of making a decision further down the tree.
[MFDO2] (Q45)
I think my role is going to be the one where it has
to stop and it can’t be probabilistic because it [...]
does come to a yes or no, issue it, don’t issue it.
So to some extent, probabilistic forecasting does
feel like everyone else just pushing things down the
line saying you make the decision, [...], we have to
make the decision because we’re the last ones on
the line. [FWDO2] (Q46)
A few interviews however perceive this transition as an
opportunity for early-warning and long-term planning.
I think in an incident I’m happy that that’s [...] a
useful range of things to know, [...] you probably
warn for the lowest one and plan for the highest
one and we can interpret between them. [FWDO2]
(Q47)
We’re talking about some of these decisions that
have got a long lead time, we’re going to move
people around the country, we’re going to move
equipment. It takes a long time to do that. [I1]
(Q48)
It was also clear from the interviews that the transition
needs to be gradual to give Duty Officers time to build confi-
dence in the new system.
It is something to bear in mind that if probabilis-
tic forecasting put too much pressure and stress on
decision making on the people in these roles, the
system probably would just collapse, people would
walk away. [FWDO2] (Q49)
The term “binary” decision which transpires through
quotes Q41–44 and in the current practice quote Q8 may
be deceiving. The FWDOs can make a range of differ-
ent decisions (from incident planning to flood warning; see
Sect. 3.2.4), and a decision is never “bad” nor “good” but
should be the “best” that can be made at a point in time with
the information available. In the face of a socio-political con-
text that is demanding ever more precise information and
with the rise of a post-factual society (i.e. culture in which
public opinion depends on appeals to emotions rather than
objective facts), the general trust in science might be a limit-
ing factor to the uptake of probabilistic forecasts (Soares and
Dessai, 2015; Golding et al., 2017; Knudsen and de Bolsée,
2019). Very often, the ability of an institution to pick up new
information and methods is not only down to them, but could
also be influenced by the wider socio-political context and
other key actors in the decision-making web (e.g. the gov-
ernment, local authorities, regulations and guidelines), in ad-
dition to the populations at risk and the way they respond to
flood warnings (Dessai and Hulme, 2004; Morss et al., 2005;
Parker et al., 2009). Michaels (2014) states that “conveying
the uncertainties surrounding scientific knowledge and ad-
mitting the limitations of that knowledge helps gain and re-
tain decision makers’ and the public’s trust”. In the current
practice, forecast confidence is already communicated to an
extent to the public (see Sect. 3.2.4). This is a step towards
probabilistic forecasting. But how big of a step is still needed
to reach that full transition to probabilistic flood forecasts?
Recommendation 7. To address a socio-political con-
text demanding ever more precise information, we rec-
ommend that the EA, as the lead authority for flood
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warning in England, communicates (via engagement
campaigns, videos, email newsletters, social media up-
dates and webinars, etc.) with external players (i.e.
emergency responders, the public and professional part-
ners) ahead of this transition to ensure that they are
aware that probabilistic forecasting will become opera-
tional practice and to communicate the benefits of prob-
abilistic over deterministic forecasting. This includes
rethinking the language that will be used in warning
messages going out to the public and, as part of the EA’s
strategic overview role, preparing external decision-
makers on how this might change their practices.
It is also important to note that “moving to probabilistic fore-
casting from deterministic forecasting may trigger an institu-
tional shift in who is responsible for decision making un-
der uncertainty” (Michaels, 2014). Because making a de-
cision based on probabilistic information is more nuanced
than using deterministic information, the outcome will deter-
mine who will be “blamed”, and this ownership of the uncer-
tainty judgment might have implications for the forecaster–
user relationships (Michaels, 2014). With regards to the im-
plementation of the European Commission’s European Flood
Awareness System (EFAS), sending flood alerts to Euro-
pean national flood forecasting agencies, it was noted that
EFAS users were concerned about being held responsible for
“wrong” EFAS alerts (Demeritt et al., 2010). This echoes
our findings regarding some of the interviewed Duty Offi-
cers’ fears regarding this transition potentially pushing more
of the interpretation on to the FWDOs (see quotes Q45 and
Q46). This worry seems present in the current practice to an
extent, as an interviewed FWDO expressed the difficulties of
forecast-based decision-making and their concern of being
“scored low” as a result (see quote Q21). Furthermore, those
not involved in the probabilistic forecast production may not
be comfortable with the responsibility of interpreting the un-
certainty they convey (Faulkner et al., 2007; Michaels, 2014).
In this context, decision-making methods can provide a
framework to support users in making a decision based on
probabilistic forecasts, ensuring that decisions are made “ob-
jectively, with confidence and an understanding of uncer-
tainty” (Dale et al., 2012). Examples of decision-making
methods from the literature (see Duan et al., 2019, for more
examples) include (1) the series of decision-support meth-
ods developed by Dale and Wicks (2013), where the efforts
associated with using each specific method are proportional
to the costs and benefits of the decision at stake. The ba-
sic method associates a probability threshold with a specific
flood incident management action based on expert judgement
and local knowledge. The detailed method is based on a pre-
defined water level–impact relationship used to determine,
in real time, whether the average forecasted flood impact (if
no action is taken) is greater than the flood incident manage-
ment action cost (Dale et al., 2012); (2) a method for data-
scarce locations, which links the latest forecast with an action
based on the magnitude of past flood events and the decision-
makers’ willingness to “act in vain” (Coughlan de Perez et
al., 2016); (3) the current EA method for decision-making
based on ensemble surge forecasts, where extreme probabil-
ities are communicated with responders who understand the
low probability but need to mobilise out to 5 d ahead and
escalate or scale down responses closer to the event as the
uncertainty narrows down (Gold and Connolly, 2018).
Recommendation 8. Given the FWDOs’ fears of hav-
ing to interpret the probabilistic forecast and poten-
tially being blamed for decisions made, we recommend
the co-design of a tailored risk-based decision-making
framework between the FFC and the EA Duty Officers.
This will promote a co-ownership of the methods so that
Duty Officers are more comfortable in interpreting and
using the probabilistic forecast.
“Institutional mandates understandably dictate what staff
members emphasize” (Michaels, 2014). As shown in the EA
current practice, decisions are sometimes led by internal pro-
cedures and politics (see Sect. 3.2.4). The cultural landscape
in which decision-makers operate not only has an impact on
the decision-making outcome, but may also have an impact
on an institution’s uptake of probabilistic flood forecasts in
practice (Nobert et al., 2010; Ishikawa et al., 2011; McEwen
et al., 2012; Demeritt et al., 2013; Michaels, 2014). Insti-
tutions like the EA have specific flood management priori-
ties: seeking to avoid false alarms or, on the contrary, seek-
ing to avoid missed flood events, and complying with the
minimum and maximum lead times at which they have to is-
sue flood warnings. There is no doubt that probabilistic fore-
casts will offer a very different perspective on these factors.
Bischiniotis et al. (2019) for example showed that the opti-
mal lead time to trigger action depends on both the actions’
operational implementation time and the probabilistic flood
forecast quality. While the EA currently operates with pre-
defined lead times for each specific planning and response
activity (see Sect. 1), probabilistic forecasts could in theory
provide earlier indications of potential upcoming floods, giv-
ing the EA more time to prepare ahead of a flood event. A
few interviewed Duty Officers indeed perceive this transition
as an opportunity for early-warning and long-term planning
(see quotes Q47 and Q48).
Recommendation 9. To ensure an EA-wide successful
transition in practice, we recommend that the EA adapt
their wider flood management priorities. For example,
the EA will have to be prepared to move towards lead
times that reflect the probabilistic forecast predictabil-
ity. To this end, tailored studies should be carried out
during the system’s co-design and implementation to
identify new planning and warning lead times (reflect-
ing the probabilistic forecast predictability – and there-
fore the event and catchment type, actions’ operational
implementation time, and the EA’s acceptable flood in-
cident management action vs. impact cost ratio). This
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should be done with ample time for testing by the EA
Duty Officers.
Morss et al. (2005) found that “although flood manage-
ment practitioners might appreciate more certain hydro-
meteorological information, scientific uncertainty is often
swamped by other factors (e.g. community perception, time,
money and resource constraints) and thus is not a high pri-
ority.” When uncertainties are evident and decision stakes
are high, as is the case for the uncertainty communicated by
probabilistic forecasts for flood incident management, tradi-
tional decision-making pathways could become ineffective
and soft values (dependent on culture, context and personal
experience; see Sect. 3) might become more important than
hard scientific facts (e.g. river level correlations, model per-
formance and local knowledge to an extent; see Sect. 3;
Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). Given the complex decision-
making landscape within which EA Duty Officers operate
(see Sect. 3), this could translate to low probabilities of ex-
treme events being ignored, which could have ultimately led
to appropriate and earlier flood warnings.
Furthermore, facing constantly evolving soft values, some
decision-makers may find familiarity with the scientific
methods they use reassuring, reducing their personal will-
ingness to adopt new scientific methods (Morss et al., 2005;
Ishikawa et al., 2011). The interviewees’ personal willing-
ness was captured during these interviews, hinted at by the
range of quotes presented in this Sect. 4.
To ensure that users gradually adapt to a new system, there
should be a reasonable period of overlap between two sys-
tems (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). Additionally, as men-
tioned by Thielen et al. (2006, 2009), who documented the
implementation of EFAS, the success of a new system should
be measured via end-user feedback used to update design and
procedures throughout the system’s operational implementa-
tion.
Recommendation 10. To ensure a successful transition
during which users can gradually adapt to the new sys-
tem, we recommend a reasonable period of overlap be-
tween the two scenarios and the probabilistic forecast-
ing system. During that time of overlap, end-user feed-
back should be collected from all key players and con-
sidered to update the new system’s design and proce-
dures.
4.5 Additional recommendations
As mentioned in Sect. 4.1, while some interviewed Duty Of-
ficers knew about the transition to probabilistic forecasting
and were involved in the technical design of the new fore-
casting system, a few interviewees had just learnt about the
transition a few days prior to the interviews. This may help
explain the diversity of perceptions presented in this Sect. 4
and some of the perceived challenges. Golding et al. (2017)
identified the lack of user engagement as a great limiting fac-
tor in the uptake of climate information in practice. Ramos et
al. (2010) additionally advocated the use of integrated plat-
forms to allow a continuous exchange between scientists and
decision-makers in real time.
Recommendation 11. In light of the Duty Officers’
perceived challenges, building on recommendation 7,
we recommend that the EA foster user engagement by
putting in place a framework to communicate progress
with all key players in the decision-making web (both
internal and external) ahead of and during the EA’s tran-
sition to probabilistic forecasts.
Other factors that may help explain the diversity of per-
ceptions reported by the quotes presented in this Sect. 4
are the wording of questions that prompted them, per-
sonal resistance, and/or the interviewees’ experience with
the 2013/2014 transition from a single flood forecast to the
two scenarios. These points were however not explored fur-
ther during the interviews and may be quite relevant for
the prospects of the upcoming change from two scenarios
to probabilistic forecasting. This merits additional investiga-
tion.
As stated in the introduction (Sect. 1), transitioning to op-
erational hydrological probabilistic forecast is still a prevail-
ing challenge in the field. Reaching out to the community
of practice and institutes which have undergone such a tran-
sition may help to gain insights and share best practice, as
some elements might be transferrable (Nobert et al., 2010;
Dale et al., 2012).
Recommendation 12. To gain external insights into
how to achieve a successful transition in practice, we
recommend that the EA reach out to the community
of practice in hydrological probabilistic forecasting,
such as HEPEX (community of international experts
in the field of probabilistic hydrological forecasting
and decision-making) and connect with institutes which
have already gone through such a transition, such as
EFAS. This could for example be done through the es-
tablishment of an advisory group and organised work-
shops.
Similarly, insights from this transition could be of great value
to the EA for future transitions, to other institutes facing or
yet to face a similar situation, and to the wider geoscience
community to contribute to the advancement of the field of
operational science (Pielke, 1997).
Post-event analyses can help improve a forecasting sys-
tem, by identifying challenges in the current system and
warning practices, and during the post-transition phase, by
evaluating the impact of the introduction of a new system
(Thielen et al., 2006). However, in the EA’s current practice,
while warnings sent out by the EA FWDOs are logged in a
database, they are not currently used for post-event analysis
(see Q21 and the associated text below it). This could have
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formed valuable insights for the current transition to proba-
bilistic forecasts at the EA.
Recommendation 13. To help future transitions at the
EA and other institutes, we recommend that the EA doc-
ument (in writing or through documentary-style inter-
views, etc.) and evaluate this transition (and the new
forecasting system, via post-event analyses).
5 Conclusions
The Environment Agency (EA) is currently transitioning
from two flood scenarios to probabilistic fluvial flood fore-
casting for operational flood incident management in Eng-
land. Probabilistic forecasts can enable a better and earlier
detection of potential future floods and their associated im-
pacts, increasing the amount of time we have to prepare.
However, there is currently a lack of clarity about how prob-
abilistic forecasts should be used for flood incident man-
agement and how this transition will affect decision-makers’
roles at the EA. To address this issue, interviews were carried
out with EA Monitoring and Forecasting Duty Officers (MF-
DOs) and Flood Warning Duty Officers (FWDOs), two roles
at the heart of the EA’s flood warning decision-making chain.
These interviews aimed to capture the Duty Officers’ cur-
rent decision-making process and their perceptions on how
this transition to probabilistic forecasting might impact their
decision-making activities. Based on these interviews and lit-
erature findings, 13 recommendations were spelled out to
support a successful transition for flood early warning in
England. The interviews highlight the complex landscape
in which EA duty officers operate and the breadth of fac-
tors that inform their decisions, in addition to the forecast.
Within this landscape, the interviews revealed that, while EA
Duty Officers already account for uncertainty and communi-
cate their confidence in the forecast they currently use, their
decision-making process is still very binary and the forecast
transmission from MFDOs to FWDOs linear to an extent.
This appears at odds with probabilistic forecasting and hints
that several elements of the EA Duty Officers’ forecast-based
decision-making process will have to change. Key recom-
mendations include (in no specific order) the following.
– Enabling the co-design of the probabilistic forecasting
system and a risk-based decision-making framework
between forecasters and EA Duty Officers.
– Updating the Duty Officers’ operating procedures with
specific guidelines on how the probabilistic forecasts
should be used in practice in combination with other
tools they currently use.
– Communicating with internal and external players (i.e.
emergency responders, the public and professional part-
ners) that probabilistic forecasting will become opera-
tional practice and clarifying the benefits of probabilis-
tic over deterministic forecasting.
– Adapting the EA’s wider flood management priorities
(e.g. warning lead times).
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Appendix A: Glossary of terms
Best estimate (BE) A forecaster’s assessment of the most likely future rainfall, river and groundwater levels, and coastal
conditions, and their impacts.
Catchment character-
istics and responses
Catchment characteristics are the features that describe a river basin (i.e. the area of land drained by
a river), such as its location, size, vegetation cover, soil type and topography. They partially define
the catchment response, the catchment’s reaction when subjected to a rainfall event (e.g. how fast
the water level increases after a rainfall event).
Confident A forecaster’s expert judgement of how certain they are that the forecast is right, combining various
sources of information (e.g. model performance information). Please note that in the literature, the
term “confident” may also refer to the uncertainty range of a prediction, where a “confident” forecast
is an ensemble forecast with a small uncertainty range.
Convective rainfall
events
The sun heats the ground, warming up the air above it. This causes the air to rise. As the air rises it
cools and condenses, forming water droplets that organise into clouds and lead to rainfall. Convective
rainfall events can lead to thunderstorms.
Decision-makers Persons whose professional role requires them to make important actionable decisions based on one





UK government department responsible for safeguarding the UK’s natural environment and sup-
ported by 33 agencies and public bodies, including the Environment Agency (EA).
http://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-environment-food-rural-affairs (last
access: 10 August 2020)
Deterministic
forecast
Refers to a forecast which gives a single possible outcome of the future rainfall, river and ground-
water levels and coastal conditions.
Ensemble Instead of running a single deterministic forecast, computer models can run a forecast several times,
using slightly different inputs to account for uncertainties in the forecasting process. The complete
set of forecasts is called an “ensemble”, and each individual forecast within it are “ensemble mem-
bers”. Each ensemble member represents a different possible scenario of future rainfall, river and
groundwater levels and coastal conditions. Each scenario is equally likely to occur.
Environment Agency
(EA)
An executive non-departmental public body sponsored by Defra. The EA has an operational respon-
sibility to manage risks of flooding from rivers and the sea in England, by warning and informing
the public and businesses about impending floods.
http://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/environment-agency (last access: 10 August 2020)
False alarms A warning given ahead of an event (e.g. flood) that does not ultimately occur.
Flood action groups Cores of local people who act as representative voices for their wider community. They work along-
side agencies and authorities and meet on a regular basis with the aim of reducing their community’s
flood risk and improving its resilience to flooding.
Flood Forecasting
Centre (FFC)
A partnership between the Environment Agency and the UK Met Office. It provides a UK-wide 24/7
hydro-meteorological service to emergency responders to better prepare for flooding (river, surface
water, tidal/coastal and groundwater).
http://www.ffc-environment-agency.metoffice.gov.uk (last access: 10 August 2020)
Flood Guidance
Statement (FGS)
A daily flood risk forecast for the UK, produced by the FFC (in collaboration with the EA and Natural
Resources Wales) to assist with strategic, tactical and operational planning decisions. It gives a flood
risk assessment shown by county and unitary authority across England and Wales over the next 5 d
for all types of natural flooding (coastal/tidal, river, groundwater and surface water). The FGS is






An institute’s priorities for preparing for and responding to flood events.
Flood management
measures
Solutions to reduce the impacts that floods pose to humans and the environment. They can be natural
(e.g. planting vegetation to retain extra water in the ground) or engineered (e.g. flood barriers).
Flood preparedness Measures taken to prepare for and reduce the effects of a flood event.
Flood scenarios Possible future development of a flood event and its associated likelihood.
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Flood wardens Volunteers from local communities who have the responsibility to monitor watercourses in
the area they cover and contact local authorities with up to date information.
Forcing The action of inputting information into a computer model to produce a forecast.
Forecast accuracy The level of agreement between the forecast and the truth (i.e. what is observed in reality).
Forecasting product A comprehensive and tailored overview (i.e. in the form of text, graphics and/or tables, etc.)
of the forecast.
Hydraulic models Mathematical models of the movement of water in a system (e.g. a river).
Hydrological model Simplified model of a real-world system that describes the water cycle.
Hydro-meteorological Hydro-meteorology is a branch of meteorology and hydrology that studies the transfer of
water and energy between the land surface and the lower atmosphere. Hydro-meteorological
observations include observations of meteorological (e.g. temperature and rainfall) and hy-
drological variables (e.g. river and groundwater levels). Hydro-meteorological forecasts are
forecasts that predict the evolution of meteorological and hydrological variables in time.
Hydro-Meteorological
Services
Hydro-meteorological forecasting products generated by the FFC and issued daily (Hydro-
Meteorological Guidance), twice daily (Forecast Meteorological Data) or whenever required
(Heavy Rainfall Alerts).
Lead time The length of time between when the forecast is made and the occurrence of the event (e.g.
flood) being predicted.
Missed events An event, for example a flood, for which no warning was given ahead of it happening.
Model performance The level of agreement between the model’s outputs and their observations in reality. The
difference between a model output and its respective observation is the error. The lower the
error, the greater the model performance.
Nowcasting Extrapolating from the latest observations (e.g. radar rainfall) to forecast the evolution of, for
example the weather, in the next couple of hours.
Operational decision-
making
Decision-making based on real-time information to resolve imminent situations.
Outlooks Refers to forecasting products based on monthly to seasonal forecasts.
Performance measures Metrics that characterise the quality of a forecast or a model compared to observations.
Probabilistic forecasts While a deterministic model gives a single possible outcome for an event, a probabilistic
model gives a probability distribution as a solution, indicating the likelihood of each scenario
to occur. By design, probabilistic forecasts display the uncertainty in our estimates of future
water levels. See “Ensemble” for information on how these forecasts can be produced.
Rapid-response
catchments
Catchments and rivers that respond quickly to rainfall events.




A forecaster’s assessment of the potential upper range of future rainfall, river and groundwater
levels, and coastal conditions, and their impacts.
Risk A combination of likelihood and impact of an event.
River level
correlations
Mathematical characterisation of the river level at one point of the river with respect to an-
other point on the river. This can be used to estimate the river level at a point on the river if
the river level upstream is known.
Surge forecasts Forecasts of the rise of water along coastlines.
Uncertainty Having limited knowledge or understanding of our environment, it is impossible to charac-
terise and predict its evolution with 100 % certainty. Ensemble or probabilistic forecasting
can be used to represent the uncertainty in our estimates of future water levels, among others.
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Figure B1. Visual examples of current operational forecast products and fluvial flood forecast messages and products used and produced
by EA MFDOs and FWDOs for various dates in the past: (a) Flood Guidance Statement, (b) Hydro-meteorological Guidance, (c) Forecast
Meteorological Data, (d) Rainfall Scenario Map, (e, f) Heavy Rainfall Alert, (g) “best estimate” (BE) and “reasonable worst case” (RWC)
rainfall and water level scenarios on the NFFS, (h) written description of the two forecast scenarios (the “best estimate” BE and the “rea-
sonable worst case” RWC) from an MFDO, (i) EA flood alerts and warnings to the public, and (j) fluvial flood alert message to the public.
Sources: panels (a)–(h) were obtained from the EA, and panels (i) and (j) were obtained from Twitter and the EA active warnings website:
https://flood-warning-information.service.gov.uk/warnings (last access: 10 August 2020), respectively. Note that these examples are not for
the same dates as these were not available.
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